Myanmar: The Path Forward
In his November 2012 trip to Myanmar, former President Barack Obama galvanized Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi as “an icon of democracy who has inspired people not just in this country but around the world.” Long infamous for its military dictatorships and Chinese partnerships, Myanmar finally embraced the West—or so it seemed—when it adopted a new constitution in 2008 and carried out a peaceful transition of power in 2011. Unfortunately, new political institutions cannot expunge the remnants of five decades of military rule, let alone curb the overbearing influence of generals, who still occupy key public posts. To deescalate the Rohingya genocide, ensure the sustainability of the Burmese government, and salvage her international image, Aung San Suu Kyi—the leader of the ruling party, the National League for Democracy—will need to tame the military.
During the presidency of Thein Sein, the Burmese government inaugurated a peace process between the Tatmadaw (the Armed Forces of Myanmar) and ethnic armed organizations, non-state militias that recruit from local communities. In 2015, the Tatmadaw and eight active militias signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, calling for more dialogue between the two parties. Although the Agreement is a step towards reconciliation, the international community has no reason to be hopeful. For one, some of the largest ethnic organizations in Myanmar did not sign the Agreement. One of these groups is the Arakan Army, which instigated clashes between the Rohingya Muslims and the Burmese security forces, and later blamed the conflict on “savage Bengali Muslim terrorists.”
In addition to the narrow scope of the Agreement, the flimsiness of previous ceasefires suggests that the underlying causes of ethnic violence have yet to be addressed. In the 1990s, the government signed up to twenty agreements with a plethora of ethnic rebel groups, many of which ignored the terms of the ceasefires and continued their armed insurgencies. Even when the ceasefires succeeded in establishing peace, local populations approached them with incredulity; instead of giving minorities more representation in the national government, Burmese leaders co-opted and bribed ethnic groups in exchange for an unreliable peace.
To achieve a lasting peace, Aung San Suu Kyi will need to disarm all ethnic organizations while simultaneously giving them a greater voice in the legislature. Militant groups grow illicit crops and sell them abroad in order to finance their weapons and pay their soldiers. Chinese companies—the biggest clientele for the Burmese drug industry—encourage ethnic groups to produce opium and amphetamines. Aung San Suu Kyi should negotiate with Chinese leaders and ensure that foreign entities cease to condone ethnic warfare. Unless the government destroys its war economy, Myanmar’s ethnic groups will continue to exploit the black market.
Marginalized minorities turn to smuggling, drug trade, and ammunition because they have no way of expressing their grievances in government bodies. The 2008 Constitution gives army officers a quarter of the seats in Parliament and allows the military to monopolize the government through the National Defense and Security Council, which is Myanmar’s supreme authority. More shockingly, the 2008 Constitution—the same one that was hailed for its progressive ideals—offers impunity to military officials that commit sexual violations, submit their soldiers to forced labor, and recruit children into their armies. It is precisely this disdain for the rule of law that precipitated the Rohingya genocide, and this blind trust in the military that prevents Aung San Suu Kyi from sympathizing with the other side.
A permanent solution to the crisis would not only require humanitarian aid, but also an overhaul of the Burmese constitution. Citizenship should be granted to all long-standing Burmese residents, and the military should not reserve seats in the bicameral legislature. Civilian participation in government should be encouraged, not stigmatized, and US aid should be conditional on the integration of the Rohingya into Burmese society, more particularly on their ascension to legal status. When Trump visits Asia in two weeks, he must depart from his predecessor’s legacy and clarify that “partial democracies” are not democracies, and should not be treated as such by Western leaders. But he will also need to play a constructive role, offering the US’s support in curbing the crisis in exchange for democratic reforms in the future.