Insurgency: The Next Big Problem

This summer’s campaign against the Islamic State (IS) was, by most measures, a success. Major capitals of the self-established caliphate, most notably Mosul and Raqqa, were reclaimed by an international coalition of U.S., Iraqi and Kurdish forces. Even Russia and Iran backed Syrian government forces; they took back cities that served as fallbacks for militants forced out of Iraq. Nevertheless, the battles for Mosul and Raqqa left much of both cities destroyed and the campaigns were stained with civilian and military deaths. The Mosul offensive in June displaced about 270,000 residents, the number increasing with each further month of fighting. Even now, with the Islamic State’s major power centers broken, there are still thousands of militants left in the region, and more may join the cause. Insurgencies are notoriously difficult to eradicate because, unlike more conventional enemies, the center of the movement is not a leader or geographic location. Instead, it is an idea that guides the actions of people unbound by physical separation.

The most striking example of their continued power, even in retreat, came last Sunday when Syrian government forces drove IS out of Qaryatayn. When 50 militants overran the town last month, they immediately began their revenge killings. In the following weeks, IS beheaded or shot 70 civilians, 120 by some counts, dumping a large number of the bodies in ditches or open spaces.

The Islamic State began as an offshoot of al Qaeda until the latter organization’s downfall  by 2014. In June of the same year, IS controlled more than 50 locations and grew that number to over 127, taking hold of large expanses in both Syria and Iraq. This widespread dominance proved to be the key to sustaining the self-dubbed caliphate. Revenue from extorting civilians, kidnapping, taxes and access to oil fields and dams. Their fighting was sustained by seizing military bases and checkpoints.

Now that its property has severely decreased, IS will have to return to its original state of insurgency. Although it will be harder for them to terrorize Syrian and Iraqi citizens, having relinquished control over most cities, an insurgency poses an even greater challenge. The power of insurgent movements like IS lies in their ability to constantly adapt. Leaders or soldiers may be eliminated by military force, but as long as the driving idea remains appealing to even one person, the harm is not over. IS may have lost the majority of its revenue, but there is no end to the possible damage when you consider the group as a body committed to a goal rather than a ruler or other tangible goal. Anyone that identifies with the anti-Western sentiment or has been adversely affected by the presence of the United States in their country need only drive a car or own a knife, proven again and again by the terror attacks across Europe. IS then gets to claim the civilian death count without expending any effort or losing anything at all. Their soldiers are, after all, completely interchangeable.

In spite of the international coalition’s success on the battlefield, the IS networks to create this kind of damage aren’t disrupted. The militants can still gain popular support, often using the United States’ intervention to incite further violence. Their clever use of social media also makes it nearly impossible to stop their message from spreading, especially in societies that value freedom and privacy rights, the same societies against which IS wages war. Even barbaric acts like beheadings give the group credibility and are widely covered by the media.

If American troops remain in the Middle East, where they have been training government forces and remained a constant presence for the past 16 years, they will be targeted and used to radicalize others. American airstrikes in particular galvanize local opposition. The United States has been heavily criticized for the civilian death toll and its support of other countries, like Saudi Arabia, that commit war crimes. One instance stands out in particular: when Saudi Arabia bombed a funeral in Sana’a, Yemen, and the White House did nothing to condemn the action.

The nature of insurgency leaves any opposing country with limited options. The most secure one is to eliminate the motivation to follow IS ideals. As a rule, people tend to value their own life and won’t throw it away unless their only perceived course of action is to follow these types of extremist terrorist groups. Take away the grievance and you take away the need for revenge. Of course, it is extremely hard to shift the culture that drastically, especially given the United States’ horrible track record in the Middle East. The more realistic option, then, is to mitigate the risk such an insurgency poses. In the United States, where a culture shift is easier to create, the government must build a society that welcomes everyone in it, rather than opening up the possibility of radicalization. Abroad, the government can’t expect that throwing more fire- and manpower at the problem will make it go away. But if IS can no longer fund itself, can no longer disseminate its twisted message and is shown to have no foothold in the minds of the people, it is limited to spewing hatred rather than acting on its extremist ideology. It would seem that the only way to protect from insurgency is not to eliminate it, because ideas always find a foothold, but to manage it effectively.