Crimea and Ukraine
By: Joonyoung Heo
In the past few weeks, Russian President Vladimir Putin has made his position of hostility unmistakably clear, escalating Russo-Ukrainian tensions to new heights. More than 100,000 Russian troops are gathered on Ukraine’s eastern border, and “battalion tactical groups” are stationed in Belarus (directly north of Ukraine) and seem poised to invade at any moment. Nobody can be sure as to what Putin is planning, or what his motives might be. His end goal could encompass everything from taking the Ukrainian capital Kyiv and overthrowing the foreign government to expanding Russian territory to keeping the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on edge.
But perhaps one shouldn’t be too surprised. After all, this isn’t the first time Putin has found himself at the center of so much attention. In 2014, Russia invaded and annexed the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine. One could call the Russo-Ukrainian crisis today a continuation of this conflict. Many countries, including Ukraine, condemned the act as a direct violation of international law. Under Boris Yeltsin’s presidency, Russia had signed several key treaties that acknowledged Ukraine’s territorial integrity, like the 1991 Belavezha Accords. This agreement officially dissolved the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and recognized the sovereignty of the former Soviet nations. Putin didn’t care. In pursuit of geopolitical gain, largely in the warm water port of Sevastopol, the largest city in Crimea, he powered through. Claiming that the Russian Federation only wished to “ensure proper conditions for the people of Crimea to be able to freely express their will,” he formally admitted Crimea shortly afterward.
Given this political precedent, one might assume that Putin will simply launch another invasion. The European Union (EU) and many others may have severed a few ties with and imposed various sanctions on Russia, the likes of which the country had not seen since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but those appear to have had little effect. One could essentially argue that Putin got away scot-free. There are several key points of contrast, however, that make Ukraine’s case very different, and that ultimately diminish the true likelihood of a Russian invasion. At the very least, they will have given Putin something to think about.
The most significant difference lies in the political circumstances of 2014 and 2022. The Crimean annexation took place almost immediately after the Revolution of Dignity (also known as the Maidan revolution) in Ukraine, which ousted president Viktor Yanukovych and the contemporary government in Kyiv. There were riots and shootings as protesters seized control of the capital buildings. It was political turmoil in every sense of the term, and it gave Russia the perfect opportunity to, as Putin told his security service chiefs, “start working on returning Crimea to Russia.” The Russian government had its pretext: to restore order and protect the majority population of ethnic Russians. There was considerable uncertainty throughout the whole affair, and much of the world could only stand to the side and watch it unfold. The revolution and subsequent coup d’état allowed Putin to take control with minimum backlash.
In contrast, the Ukraine that Russia faces today has had eight years of something close to stability. There hasn’t been a mass protest or a popular uprising in recent times––certainly not a subversive, full-scale revolution with guns and violent riots. What is more, Putin lacks a clear pretext. In 2014, he was able to use the wellbeing of the Russian population of Crimea to slide his troops into the country. Now, he appears to the world as the sole aggressor, the instigator of any potential conflict. Should Putin throw caution to the wind and launch an invasion, this will undoubtedly affect the severity of international response and, as a result, the Russian economy.
Ukraine must not be underestimated in military strength, either; many of us assume that the country is a pushover, and that it couldn’t possibly dissuade Putin from an invasion. Perhaps this was true in 2014, when Yanukovych was overthrown and the nation was locked in disorder. Not anymore. Russia is a global superpower, of course, and Ukraine won’t be able to shut Putin out forever, but they can make it a nightmare for the Russian army to advance and seize Ukrainian territory. A 2019 survey conducted by the private research organization Levada Center and commissioned by John O’Loughlin from the University of Colorado in Boulder, found that 82 percent of the Crimean population supported its accession to Russia in 2014. Not so in present-day Ukraine. Eight years have been enough time for a sense of national identity to take hold; in a 2017 public opinion survey by Rating Group Ukraine, 57 percent expressed a “very cold or cold attitude” toward Russia, while only 17 percent had a “very warm or warm attitude.” If Putin doesn’t have the local Ukrainian populace on his side, holding territory in the face of long-term insurgency will prove to be an even greater challenge.
Popular support back home is yet another factor that Putin cannot afford to ignore. Most Russians have consistently supported the Crimean annexation; the Levada Center records a 24 percent increase in Putin’s popularity rating immediately following the event in 2014. On the other hand, few advocate for a deadly war in Ukraine. It’s generally preferred that the two nations remain friendly neighbors. Launching an invasion would certainly add momentum to Putin’s declining popularity rating. In October 2021 Levada reported that 42 percent of the Russian populace did not wish to see Putin’s presidency after 2024, an all-time high in nearly a decade. If he succeeds in his Ukrainian venture, it would prompt an avalanche of economic sanctions from the international community. Although Russia has tried to construct a “fortress economy” by boosting reserves and decreasing foreign dependency on key resources, it will not be impervious to harm. Putin and the Russian elite could be prevented from spending abroad. With banks cut off from the global financial system, the power of Russian corporations could likewise be constricted, more so than it was in 2014, draining billions from the economy. The ensuing recession would cause living standards for the average Russian, which have already been riding a downward spiral in the past seven years, to plummet. Conversely, if he fails––and Russia suffers heavy losses––the public will be outraged. Putin may be an autocrat, but history has consistently underscored the strength of popular uprisings. If the entire country turns against him, we might see his power begin to crumble.
Finally, the stakes are higher than ever for the rest of the world. Allowing Russia to invade could set the wrong precedent and fuel Putin’s ambitions for a new Russian empire, making more European territory seem enticing. Belligerent political groups might reasonably surmise that instigating open warfare goes unpunished in the twenty-first century, triggering a chain reaction of serious conflicts over other disputed borders. Iran and Syria could be encouraged to use violence with impunity, making a bad situation worse. As tensions in Asia heighten, China could become more confident in a potential invasion of Taiwan. Just as importantly, NATO would lose reputation and the United States, following its withdrawal from Afghanistan, could continue to decline in standing before the eyes of the world. Breach of international law could become commonplace when the voice of authority is lost in the clamor of war. Most nations thus have an incentive to prevent a Russian invasion. If Putin pushes forward with his plan, foreign intervention is a real possibility.
A popular basis for a high probability of an imminent Russian invasion is that Putin cannot afford to let Ukraine “fall” to the West. If Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accepts a place in NATO, as he seemed ready to do, the country would slip from Russia’s sphere of influence––a nightmare for Putin. In many ways, he could see it as a serious threat to national security; for instance, Russia shares a considerable chunk of its western border with Ukraine, making it a strategically ideal point from which to undermine Moscow. But even this is not sufficient incentive for a Ukrainian invasion. As I have explained, there are other factors that could well discourage Putin. His escalation of the crisis could very realistically be nothing more than a show of power, meant to deter NATO from eyeing Ukraine too closely. An invasion, after all, is not the only way to retain a regional hegemony.
Such are the key differences between Crimea and present-day Ukraine. The fact that Putin was able to take control of Crimea in 2014 with relatively trivial consequences says little about what he should do now, or what might unfold if he decides to forge ahead. Ukraine has grown significantly in the mere span of eight years, particularly in military strength. Popular support at home has taken a sharp turn and the international community has good reason to dissuade sovereign expansion. These are factors that Putin must take into consideration. A hasty, miscalculated step in the wrong position might just tip the scales against his favor.
