The Brexit Blame Game
For the first time in my life, I’ve followed British politics for two weeks as more than a casual spectator. Broadly speaking, I have come to one consistent conclusion—the blame for the Brexit catastrophe lies squarely in the hands of Theresa May and the Conservative Party writ-large.
In fact, this crisis began with a reckless Tory political gamble when then-Prime Minister David Cameron agreed to support a referendum in order to win over voters from UKIP, a far-right, anti-immigrant, Eurosceptic party in the 2015 general election. He did so despite opposing Brexit himself and campaigning against it. It makes one wonder why Cameron would call the referendum in the first place, if not to shore up support for a Conservative government. And it certainly would imply that the Tories knew exactly what they were getting Britain into—there was never a clear solution offered for Northern Ireland, there was never a clear answer about customs protection and there was never a clear deal put forth. So that’s the first problem with Brexit, caused by the Conservatives.
The second problem? Immediately after the referendum passed, which the government should at least have been prepared for the possibility of, Prime Minister Cameron resigned and tossed off the hat to Theresa May. And so, she came into office proclaiming that “Brexit means Brexit.”
Unfortunately for her, no one truly understood what Brexit meant to begin with, because no one made that clear. The proponents of Brexit simultaneously expressed a desire for a deal of some sort, while still enumerating plenty of dealbreakers—the Leave camp wanted no jurisdiction for the European Court of Justice, no free movement of people, no financial contribution, regulatory independence and an independent trade policy. Such a relationship would be unprecedented; no other nation shares a similar relationship with the EU, either on its inside or outside. Of course, this all was supposed to be tremendously easy; in fact, Brexiteer MP Liam Fox said that a free trade deal with the European Union would be “the easiest in history.”
Of course, at some point along the line, the Tories must have realized that toying with the fate of the British economy for extra votes may have backfired. They must have known that negotiating this deal wouldn’t be so easy as the Brexiteers, who they enabled, had thought. So, sensing the moment was right, Theresa May called a snap election to “strengthen her hand” in Brexit negotiations. And what happened? The Conservatives lost a majority in Parliament, and were forced into a coalition with the hardline Democratic Unionist Party, the political project of none other than the bigoted Ian Paisley, who said of Catholics: “They breed like rabbits and multiply like vermin.” This is the founder of the DUP, mind you.
Needless to say, that backfired, and now there is no clear support in Parliament for any sort of proposal, in large part because backbench Conservative MPs, the very ones elected on the promise of a referendum, refused to back any of Theresa May’s deals, all of which tried to straddle the line between a soft and a hard Brexit. Naturally, her plans contained no provision for the issues of Northern Ireland’s political status other than kicking the can down the road. This is problematic because any deal that leaves open the eventual possibility of a hard border on Northern Ireland would undermine the spirit (and if it actually happens, the text) of the Good Friday agreement, the treaty holding together Ireland’s fragile peace. Any violation of the Agreement or any hard border on Northern Ireland would risk reigniting the sectarian violence characteristic of the Troubles. That would be unacceptable. And if Britain were to have no hard border on Ireland, but one in Britain, it would leave the entire Irish isle outside of the customs jurisdiction of the UK, including the North, drawing the island one step closer to reunification. Of course, hardline Unionists (those who support British rule in Northern Ireland) would never tolerate this. And to which party do these hardline Unionists belong? The DUP.
Welcome to Brexit. There’s no real solution that will please a majority on the Northern Irish issue, or on any of the countless others that define this debate—customs, trade policy, free movement, the list goes on. So, what is the solution for Mrs. May? What is the way around the fact that there is no deal with majority support under a government whose mandate she herself spoiled? Political brinkmanship, of course!
When May’s deal was rejected by the largest defeat in Parliamentary history, and then again in the third largest defeat, May reasoned that if she could hang the prospect of a disastrous no-deal over Parliament, they would buckle and end up supporting her own at the last minute. And then Parliament dashed that dream of hers as well—it voted to reject a no-deal under any circumstance, despite May using a three-line whip, the harshest means possible of keeping her party in line, and voted to delay Britain’s exit from the EU. So, in her time as Prime Minister, May has called an unpopular and disastrous election, negotiated a deal that had no chance of passing, tried to force the country to the brink of a no-deal to pass her plan and failed to keep her own government in line with her agenda. In short, she has ruined any pretense of effectiveness.
I don’t typically like to play the blame game, but it sometimes can be helpful—if we know what the problem is, we can remove said problem. And in this case, the blame for Brexit lies squarely at the feet of the Conservative Party, and the inept and reckless Brexit policy pursued by two of its governments. There is only one solution to the Brexit crisis—a general election and a Labour government.