The Difficult Process of Negotiating with Iran

Do not negotiate out of fear, but do not fear to negotiate–an overused chiasmus that any fellow long-suffering Model UN-ers reading this article will know. Most of the time though, it is true that the high-flown language of diplomats in UN meetings is as flowery as it is futile; despite what they say, countries will always prioritize their domestic interests and compromise only when there is concrete benefit, either political or fiscal, to be reaped from a multilateral deal. The successful negotiator, even when forced against the wall, never wants to give off the aura that they are willing to lean in and give up their position of power. In such situations, withdrawing from the table might even be a preferable option, to preserve the nation’s dignity and integrity.

No country understands this better than the Islamic Republic of Iran, a Middle Eastern sovereign state notoriously hard to deal with. After the revolution of 1979, which toppled the previously pro-American government of the last Shah, Mohammad Reza, it has constantly flirted with all-out anti-Western ideological Islamic extremism, while still attempting to maintain some commercial ties for the sake of pragmatic economic development. Iran fosters diplomatic relations with only 97 countries, a large number of them fellow members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Pitching itself firmly as part of the Non-Aligned Movement, the country defies the influence of superpowers and nurtures ambitions of leading the Middle Eastern coalition of former Third World states. Its toolkit? Energy. Oil, gas, coal. And also, the more radioactive kind.

“We do not think a nuclear Iran would be stronger ... If we have weapons of mass destruction we are not going to use them–we cannot,” says the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, apparently sending out the message that nuclear deterrence is not part of this country’s strategy. It is true that as of now, Iran is nowhere near becoming the next North Korea; however, its nuclear program has reportedly included several research sites, two uranium mines, a research reactor, and uranium enrichment plants. At the time of the negotiations, it was known to be in possession of more than 19,000 centrifuges. The risks associated with these developments had before then prompted the U.S. and EU to impose strong sanctions against Iran’s petroleum exports, greatly limiting the country’s economic development. Under the force of these sanctions, Iran had frozen assets overseas amounting to $100 billion, yet still they did not compromise. Only until the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more popularly known as the Obama administration’s Iran deal, showcase the West’s willingness to take a friendlier stance and support Iran’s economic development, did the country agree to negotiate a signatory of clauses that promoted nuclear transparency through an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection and limited nuclear enrichment to only one facility.

Did Iran greatly benefit from this deal? Of course it did - Iran’s economy had been shrinking ever since the catastrophic Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s; falling oil prices prompted a cascade of economic problems including currency devaluation and increasing unemployment rates that peaked at 20 percent. It can almost be said that the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, the EU and the U.S. combined brought upon a recession in this country,  pre-JCPOA. No U.S. company could trade with Iran in amounts of more than $20 million; the country limited export and import to a record low in 2012, producing fewer barrels of crude oil and automobiles than ever before. GDP growth was negative for the 2012-2013 cycle. As soon as the sanctions were lifted however, a windfall of unfrozen assets and trade revenues granted brought about a 6.5 percent increase for the country’s economy.

So in a sense, Trump was right in saying that the deal is benefitting Iran. Of course it is. Iran can now be counted amongst the pantheon of fast-developing countries with high economic potential, the “Next 11;” after a period of crippling hyperinflation the nation is poised to obtain enormous economic gains simply by taking advantage of its natural resources, the fifth largest in the world. If it had not perceived these concrete benefits, Iran would never have taken part in the negotiations in the first place. The willingness to compromise, on both the side of the U.S. and Iran’s reformist new leadership, the government of President Hassan Rouhani, achieved more than what unilateral pressure stretching three decades of sanctions attempted to do.

Yet as his refusal to re-certify the deal shows, Trump now wants to abolish it. Even if he were only to revise the deal and “toughen up” on the “rogue regime,” this could potentially lead to dire consequences, as an infuriated Tehran pulled out of negotiations with P5+1 altogether. And why all this hassle? Till this day, the IAEA has found no violations whatsoever on the part of Iran in adhering to limits on uranium and heavy water stockpiles.

It most likely boils down to terrorism, or rather, the U.S.’s efforts to portray Iran as the “largest state-sponsor of terrorism,” deserving no mercy or friendship from civilized Western states in their noble fight against Islamic extremism worldwide. Steeped in his rhetoric of “keeping Americans safe from Muslim jihads,” Trump views it as a personal mission to play the role of the hardliner, isolating Iran and making sure that it stays atop the U.S. Department of State’s terror regime blacklist for its support of Shiite extremist groups, most notably Hezbollahs in Lebanon and suffer the appropriate consequences thereof. Alongside reworking the JCPOA, Trump recently denounced one of the official armed forces of Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, as a terrorist group subject to U.S. sanctions. On this front, he is justified, is he not? Iran supports more than 100 Shiite terror groups, says Al Hayat, the largest pan-Arab daily published in London, funded by Saudi Arabia.

A few facts about Saudi Arabia. While the head of the Iranian government, the popularly elected Rouhani, is a lawyer, academic and diplomat who ran on a platform of modernization, increased personal freedom and collaboration with the West, Saudi Arabia is still an absolute monarchy run by the family Al Saud, the head of which is patriarch Salman Al Saud. Rouhani’s cabinet boasts of a higher number of PhD-earners from American universities than the American cabinet itself, while Saudi’s government is swamped with Al Saud members and close friends. More shockingly, with its branch of Wahhabi Sunnism, Saudi Arabia channels money into promoting the most destructive terrorist groups in the world, including Al-Qaeda, Taliban and ISIS. Osama bin Laden, as well as fifteen out of the nineteen hijackers responsible for 9/11, originated from this country. Yet currently Shiite Iran is branded as “largest state sponsor of terrorism,” just as Trump is shaking hands with Salman al Saud, while a bombastic stream of regal artworks, pearl sheaths, cheetah fur robes, gold necklaces, cheap oil and weapon deals pours onto his bowing head.

So it really isn’t about violations to nuclear agreements, and it really isn’t about state-sponsored terrorism. The story of U.S.-Iran diplomacy, or lack thereof, is more centered around realpolitik than anything else, with the former viewing the later as a sort of “traitor” for its shifting policies after the revolution of 1979. Many people have forgotten that ironically, if it wasn’t for the U.S., Iran would not have been able to launch its nuclear program in the first place; when these two states were still intimate allies during the Cold War, the U.S. provided Iran with its first nuclear reactor and nuclear fuel. Relationship has always been sore ever since a popular uprising, supported by leftist groups, students and Islamist organizations, toppled the U.S.-backed, autocratic Mohammad Reza, trading authoritarian monarchy for authoritarian theocracy.

It is a fact, however, that the Iranian leadership has never been as open-minded as it is at the current moment, with Rouhani trying his best to please a population eager for even more economic progress. Instead of treading the beaten path, the U.S. should reconsider neutralizing relationships, or even collaborating with this nation, a key player in the Middle Eastern stage. If that slightly antagonizes the Saudis, even better. Why should America pick a side in the Sunni-Shia Muslim divide anyway?