Privacy vs. Security
Starting from Edward Snowden’s disclosure of NSA’s global surveillance in 2013, we more frequently see ourselves ending up in heated debates pertaining to the use of personal data for the facilitation of justice. These arguments resurfaced with the FBI’s request for software capable of decrypting data on Apple’s iPhones in the wake of the 2015 San Bernardino shootings. One of the suspects, Syed Farook, owned an iPhone that the FBI believed could provide information to illuminate who else was behind the shootings. After numerous failed attempts to hack into the phone, mostly unsuccessful due to Apple products’ inbuilt precautions against such hacks, the FBI directly requested downloadable software from Apple that could install a “backdoor” into the iPhone. In such compromising situations, we may have to forsake our privacy to preserve the security of all at the expense of a skeleton proposal for an idea that could provide major roadblocks instead of advantages. The argument then boils down to what we value more: personal privacy or the communal safety of others? Is creating a backdoor really worth it?
The murkiness of the legal background of the FBI-Apple case and use of such outdated rules shows how unprecedented and immoral the idea of a “backdoor” really is.
From a legal standpoint, it’s evident that the Fed’s access to our private information is an affront to the Fourth Amendment, which outlaws unreasonable searches and seizures. Even with a valid warrant, the FBI’s demand that Apple break the encryption on personal data is far from moral or even constitutional. The request for Apple’s signature on the code for decrypting personal data on iPhones is compelled speech, rather than free speech. Nevertheless, the FBI has gone to great lengths to circumvent these rules by citing a 200-year-old act, the All Writs Act, that mandates a party to assist in a relevant federal investigation unless the request entails an “undue burden.” However, it can be easily argued that Apple is a private company and does not share a direct connection to their devices after issuing, thereby definitely making the request for a backdoor an undue burden. The murkiness of the legal background of the FBI-Apple case and use of such outdated rules shows how unprecedented and immoral the idea of a “backdoor” really is.
Even if the cause for a “backdoor” into the iPhone can be considered noble, we can also call into question the actual efficacy of the approach. Can a backdoor actually help us detain criminals in a fashion that trumps our current methods? The end can’t justify the means if the achievement of the desired end cannot be guaranteed. In fact, creating software for decrypting iPhones or removing the feature of wiping all encrypted data after ten unsuccessful password attempts will just make it catastrophically easier for brute force password attacks to become successful. Such a trend for all devices could even result in an eventual facilitation of cyber espionage, and the practice of creating “backdoors” could exacerbate trends of censorship in other nations by providing those presiding oppressive regimes with an ultimate weapon that leaves the private data of all citizens vulnerable. It would be an excessive length to expose misconduct in a minority of criminals while prying into the private lives of a majority of innocent, honest people. As Apple’s CEO Tim Cook notes, the crimes alluded to in monitored private data is like hate speech; it may be despicable and warrant counter-action, but it’s protected by free speech.
The “backdoor” idea itself is ridiculous when we realize that there are other ways of getting into a specific iPhone. The FBI itself soon learned of a way, with the help of an unnamed third party, to acquire the data from the phone without Apple’s assistance. A universal installation of a “backdoor” was just too risky when the immediate repercussions and future implications of such a practice are considered. We can’t perpetuate a practice that poses the very endangerment of our security it’s supposed to protect.