A Futile Fight In the Middle East

Daesh has yet again claimed responsibility for a recent stabbing attack in a Minnesota mall, and the explosion of a bomb in New York City that left 29 people injured reminded many about the growing presence of terrorism in the Western world. In the wake of many fatal terrorist shootings, political experts have suggested that only economic development and democratization can root out terrorist groups in the Middle East. At first glance, this policy makes sense: Advanced democracies, like the United States and Japan, have spurred an insignificant number of extremist groups. Institutional explanations—the lack of representation in politics, the lack of economic liberalization—seem to explain the temptation of many young adults to join terrorist organizations in order to alleviate their isolation and humiliation. Some have advocated for humanitarian aid and increased ground presence as a way to restore stability and peace to the region. While this approach seems ideal, it fails to take into account the complexity of terrorists’ demands, as well as the road blocks to and consequences of modernization in the Middle East.

"So it’s not sufficient—and nor is it correct—to say that improving economic conditions or installing democracy in the Middle East will somehow reduce the amount of extremists."

Terrorists, in general, exhibit a strong hostility towards modernization. In fact, radical Islamic terrorists see modernization as the West’s crusade against Islam. Terrorist organizations despise Western influence and see it as a barrier to fundamentalism. Though they had lived in France and Germany, respectively, for many years, the suspects in the Nice and Munich attacks this summer were nonetheless motivated to commit acts of terror. It is also unclear whether wealth correlates with one’s susceptibility to extremist ideology. Osama bin Laden came from a rich family that had close ties with the Saudi monarchy; it was not poverty, but rather the United States’ presence in the Middle East during and after the Persian Gulf War, that led him to create Al Qaeda. Poverty is a naïve, fabricated explanation that underscores the terrorists’ political goals.

Efforts to impose democracy on Middle Eastern countries lack feasibility. Interestingly, researchers have found that countries rich in natural resources (i.e. oil) have lower levels of human productivity and are less democratic, a phenomenon known as the “resource trap.” In countries with scant resources, like South Korea, governments are motivated to provide a variety of public goods, improve education and build infrastructure to increase economic productivity and become competitive on the international stage. Since the Arabian Gulf contains two-thirds of the world’s oil, leaders and monarchs have an incentive to exploit the resource for their own benefit. To them, the prospect of a stronger middle class—and thus, a powerful revolutionary force—discourages investment into the growth of the economy. The value of the resource encourages leaders to secure their regime through patrimonialism, the elimination of civil society and sometimes coercion. In other words, the problem with Middle Eastern democracy roots not from the leaders themselves, but rather from the environment and resources empowering them. The Arab Spring confirmed the lack of opportunities for individuals to express themselves politically, but also highlighted the futility of changing leadership in the Middle East.

A second problem arises from the many ethnic and religious divisions within countries of the Middle East. In Syria, the Shiite dictator Assad rules over a majority Sunni population. The disproportionate presence of separatist Kurds in the North and Christians in the South compounds this self-destructive diversity. Because of the religious nature of this conflict, even a democratic regime will fail to incorporate the interests of all the sects in the country.

So it’s not sufficient—and nor is it correct—to say that improving economic conditions or installing democracy in the Middle East will somehow reduce the amount of extremists. As our fight against Daesh continues, we must learn from our mistakes and realize the pointlessness of forcing regime change in the Middle East as we did with Saddam Hussein. Unnecessary American involvement perpetuates the terrorists’ “anti-American” narrative. In fact, the phrase “regime change” is a euphemism for the stark reality: dictatorship, followed by dictatorship. In Egypt, Mubarak’s autocracy was replaced by an even more authoritarian military rule.

I am not arguing for a fatalistic stance towards the Middle East, but rather a pragmatic one that fully accounts for the traditions, demographics, and wealth of the region. Ask yourself the question: How can we contain Daesh without prompting the growth of a deadlier organization?